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A SYMPOSIUM ON THE
JURISPRUDENTIAL BASIS OF THE LAW
OF STRICT LIABILITY
A Critical Evaluation of Case Materials
The following is a transcript from recordings made at the annual round table
meeting on jurisprudence of the Association of American Law Schools, at its
annual meeting, held on Saturday, December 29, 1956, at the Edgewater Beach
Hotel, Chicago, Illinois. This program was a pioneer effort to demonstrate a new
method of conducting round tables at conventions of jurists. It is in contrast with
the usual method of formally reading papers followed by a sporadic question period.
It is based on the premises that jurists who attend conventions should do so for the
purpose of "rubbing mind on mind", rather than listening to papers which could
be read after publication. (Editorial comment by Dr. Brown, chairman of the Round
Table.)

ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS
ROUND TABLE MEETING ON JURISPRUDENCE
DR. BRENDAN F. BROWN,

Loyola University of New Orleans,
Chairman

The Jurisprudence Round Table Meeting for 1956 will
please come to order. Our Council will undertake to present
a new type of program this afternoon. Three speakers will
present papers of about ten minutes in length on the subject
of the JurisprudentialBasis of the Law of Strict Liability, A
Critical Evaluation of Case Materials.
Six cases will principally be considered, namely:
1. Vincent v. Stinehour, 7 Vt. 62, 29 Am. Dec. 145 (1835)
(or any other "horse and buggy" traffic case.)
2. Vincent v. Lake Erie TransportationCo., 109 Minn.
456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910).
3. Any modern traffic accident case.
4. Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d. 489, 190 P. 2d 1
(1948) (or any other extrahazardous activity case).
5. Sorenson v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932)
(or any other defamation action against a large scale publisher involving statements of political or other public concern).
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6. Madsen v. East JordanIrrigationCompany, 101 Utah
552, 125 P. 2d 794 (1942).
After the presentation of the formal papers, I shall
endeavor to lead the group after the manner of a great
books discussion which will be spontaneous and unrehearsed.
Questions and comments will be expected from the audience
after the completion of the discussion. The proceedings will
be transcribed and, if possible, published.
The first paper will be presented by Professor Fleming
James Jr., of the Law School of Yale University*.
Professor James:
My approach to tort problems has not been primarily a
philosophical one. Yet it has been concerned with much
beyond the concepts and rules of tort law itself. It has often
been preoccupied with the practical implications of tort law
for the social and economic problems of current life.
In dealing with such problems one must, of course, have
a standard of values for assaying the problems themselves
and the merits of possible solutions to them, and these values
in turn must rest on some sort of justification. I have pretty
much accepted values which have wide current recognition,
and sought to employ them along pragmatic and utilitarian
lines. This has not, however, meant a ruling out of moral
considerations. Widely held feelings of what is fair or just
must necessarily play a most important part in the solution
of legal problems, whether the matter be viewed in terms of
of men and only imperfectly reflected in them.
More concretely, things which I accept as good include:
(1) the dignity of the individual; (2) the physical well-being
of the individual; (3) a wide freedom of speech, especially
about matters that concern the public; (4) the possession or
receipt of property or money; (5) the engaging in lawful
activities for the production of goods or services, or entertainment; (6) the continuing development of the arts and
sciences to advance such production; and (7) satisfying the
prevailing community sense of justice or fairness.
*Professor James' material is reprinted here by special permission of Louisiana Law Review (18 La. L. Rev. 293).
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The opposites of these things are bad.
These values are here vastly oversimplified. In other
contexts, they would need great qualification. At least some
of them might not stand up at all. But in the present context
they will serve as a useful point of departure for analysis,
though the attempt to apply and balance them in the varying
situations dealt with by tort law will yield no easy or automatic answer.
Let us start with the unintended and undesired injury
caused by D while he is in the course of pursuing a lawful
activity-with what is generally called accidental injury.
The loss caused to P is bad, but it has already happened. If
D must pay, this merely shifts the evil from P to D and society
gains nothing from that shifting (although something might
be said for a sharing of the loss by the participants). Moreover D has gained nothing from the accident and his conduct,
if it was not negligent, carried no unreasonable threat of
causing an accident. Current notions of fairness would be
offended by making innocent D pay damages under the circumstances described. Further, liability would tend somewhat
to discourage his activity (which, by hypothesis, is good).
That deterrence, however, is not an unmixed evil-if it is
not too great it might not keep D from carrying on his activity
but simply make him more careful in the prosecution of it.
Balancing all these considerations, the rational rule may
well be to exonerate D unless the manner in which he was
carrying out his legitimate activity was unreasonably dangerous. This is the rule of negligence and makes sense as
applied to matters between neighbors.
The Vincent v. Lake Erie TransportationCo. case calls
into play some different considerations. Here, too, P has
been hurt by D's lawful conduct. But D did save his own
much more valuable property by a deliberate choice of action
which entailed damage to P as a foreseen and inevitable consequence. To shift P's loss to D under such circumstances
serves some good because the very conduct which caused P's
loss has preserved to D more valuable property out of which
to pay that loss. From a purely utilitarian point of view,
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the net ill effects of the loss will therefore be reduced by this
shifting. If the parties started with equal means, the marginal utility of the sum representing P's loss is not greater
to P than to D. Moreover, shifting the loss will not inhibit
desirable conduct on D's part. From society's point of view,
D's conduct in deliberately causing a loss is justifiable only
because it prevents a greater loss or produces a gain. The
greater the disparity between the saving (or gain) and the
loss, the greater the justification. The greater this disparity,
the less will D be deterred from making the saving (or gain)
by fear or liability for the loss. It is only where the saving
(or gain) approximates the loss, that such liability will deter
the choice to make the saving; and in such cases society has
little motive to encourage the conduct which inflicts the loss.
Quite aside from these considerations from expediency,
the prevailing climate of moral opinion will accept the notion
of making D-though innocent of fault-pay for a loss he
deliberately caused another either to make a gain for himself
or to save himself from greater loss. This is attested by the
universality of provisions for compensation where eminent
domain is exercised to produce a public gain by inflicting
loss on an individual.
Where D's conduct is not to preserve his own interest
primarily, but interests of third persons, this basis of liability
on D's part may fail. There may be a reason for distributing
P's loss among the beneficiaries, but this will depend on many
factors, such as the authority of D thus to act on their behalf.
We come now to the case of the modern accident. This
is a far cry from the typical accident of a century ago. It
is no longer a matter between neighbors wherein the loss must
be borne by one or the other of them. It is usually the byproduct of commercial or industrial enterprise, or of motoring. These facts characterize the typical modern accident;
the victims as a group fall in the lowest income brackets
and are therefore least able to bear the economic loss involved.
Those who are held for these accidents (under modern systems of liability and proposed extensions of them) have the
means for combining and distributing these losses widely
among the beneficiaries of the enterprise. Moreover, these
potential defendants have chosen to engage in their activity
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in the face of statistical certainty that it will take a toll of life
and limb. Recent studies show that accidents are not usually
caused by morally blameworthy conduct on the part of the
people actually involved on the scene. Accident liability is not
generally borne by the personal participants, but by absentee
defendants, like employers or insurers. Civil liability-even
strict liability under Workmen's Compensation-has not discouraged useful enterprise but has acted as a spur to accident
prevention by the parties best placed to promote it.
Under these circumstances-if you look at the real incidence of liability and not the nominal defendant in litigation
-the reasons for liability without fault in the Vincent case
apply to the modern accident. The loss is shifted to those
who are benefiting from the enterprise which more or less
inevitably took the toll. In addition, the loss is widely distributed, and its ill effects thereby minimized by an even
further application of the economic law of marginal utility.
Moreover the risk of loss is thus made certain and calculable.
Morality and a sense of fairness might well be offended
if the loss were shifted to the individual defendant who was
the innocent instrument for causing it. The matter stands
differently where the loss is distributed among the beneficiaries of the enterprise that had to inflict losses to gain the
benefits.
Perhaps I should mention here what seems to me to be
a necessary rational corollary to strict liability in accident
cases. The argument for meeting the human needs of accident
victims and distributing their loss among the beneficiaries
of the enterprises that cause them is not an argument for
full compensation to these victims as we think of compensation
in tort cases today. It calls for damages or awards which will
provide for care, cure and rehabilitation; for the preservation
of homes and the necessary maintenance of dependents during
periods of incapacity; for the reparation of economic loss.
But allowance for intangible items like pain and suffering
(natural enough where compensation is made by a wrongdoer) may well be out of place where the bill is being footed
by innocent persons.
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This line of reasoning would, I submit, warrant strict
liability generally for accidents caused by enterprises on
activities wherein risks are now combined, or feasibly could
be and would be combined in response to pressure. The same
reasoning would, a fortiori, justify imposing strict liability
on extra-hazardous activities, as was done in the Luthringer
and Chapman' cases.
Some of the same considerations apply to Peck v. Chicago
Tribune2 and Sorenson v. Wood but not all. And here I think
countervailing considerations out-weigh them at least in that
part of defamation which lies within the field of debate and
discussion of issues of legitimate public interest. What will
be deterred here if liability is strict, will not be the enterprise
as a whole but the publishing of potentially defamatory matter. And this would lead the owners of our modern channels
of communication to restrict their use in public debate. This,
it seems to me, would be too high a price to pay for the additional protection given to private reputations by strict liability here. Moreover the injury is of a different type and
one, for which money damages is not nearly so appropriate a
remedy.
(Prof. Brown:) The next paper will be presented by
Prof. Harry Kalven Jr. of the Law School of the University
of Chicago. Professor Kalven.:
I start with some uneasiness as to the scope of the
enquiry we are embarking on this afternoon. The title, "The
Jurisprudential Basis of Strict Liability", leans in the direction of an invitation to discuss one's basic views of the proper
foundations of tort liability. The added specification that
we build our comments around particular cases seems to me
to lean away from anything quite so general and more in the
direction of an invitation to discuss specific problems in the
application of strict liability notions today. Accordingly, I
shall resolve this ambiguity by trying alternately to lean
in each direction. In any event, I am sure I speak for my torts
colleagues in thanking Dr. Brown for the very considerable
compliment involved in treating a torts issue as within the
domain of jurisprudence.
1 Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949).
Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909).

2
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Insofar as jurisprudence is concerned with the most
general concepts of specific fields of law, strict liability does
indeed have a legitimate claim to attention. It is, of course,
one of the architectonic notions of tort law. It is the base
line from which thinking about tort proceeds. The most
intelligible view of negligence surely is that it is a limitation
on liability-a limitation, that is on strict liability rather
than an extension of liability beyond intentional wrongs.
It is largely in its departures from the simplicity of strict
liability that the refinements and superstructure of tort law
have been built. Or, to put this with a more vocational emphasis, if the legal system had adhered to strict liability, tort
teachers would have a great deal less to teach and talk about.
This, then, is my first point-simply that strict liability is an
indispensable reference in any discussion of tort.
Closely related are three other observations, equally
familiar. First, strict liability is at once the most primitive
and the most sophisticated basis for liability. For some time
now the large design of torts teaching has been the tracing
of what my friend, Charles Gregory, has called the shift from
trespass to negligence to absolute liability. When strict liability is based on nothing more elaborate than the point that
the man who caused the harm should pay for it, it is, I think,
a primitive idea congenial to a system not yet concerned with
the qualifying circumstances under which one man can cause
harm to another. And we are all familiar with the point
that nothing is accomplished by having the legal system simply
shift a misfortune from the victim to the actor. My second
observation is that negligence arises as a form of doing equity.
Whatever the merits of real politik interpretations of negligence as a sop to the industrial revolution, it is also an
effort to discriminate among the cases in which harm has
been caused and to refine the crude notion that a man always
acts at his peril. My third observation is that strict liability
can be restated with great force and sophistication, as we
have learned from Professor James, but onlr in a context
that includes insurance or some other device for a wide
distribution of risk and loss. When this is done, the very
meaning of the term "liability" changes considerably. The
issue is not whether the actor or the victim should pay for
the accident, but whether compensation for accidents cannot
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in some way be "socialized." The actor is to be made liable
not because of his individual contribution to the accident but
because he is thought to be an appropriate conduit for a wide
distribution of the loss. We thus begin with a question of
justice between two individuals and end with a question of
loss administration between large groups. Let me attempt
to say this another way-in terms of the contemporary debate
utilized to spread loss was some form of accident insurance
or that in one economic view it is the workman in the end
who pays for Workmen's Compensation. Thus, in its modern
guise, strict liability may not really put into issue notions
of fault. Rather it redefines matters so as to make fault
irrelevant. The perspective is therefore closer to that of
taxation, and under pressures of contemporary thinking
about strict liability, tort law is always on the brink of
becoming a branch of public law.
The merits of strict liability in modern form is a complex
question that I will not explore at this point. My principal
point is that strict liability in its old form is a central notion
against which negligence must be held to be intelligible; and
that strict liability in its new form raises real but quite
different issues of basic policy-issues best discussed in a
broad context of social insurance and taxation.
So much then for general ruminations; I will now lean
a little toward the cases. Again I have three points, only
loosely related. First, putting to one side major legislative
overhauling of tort law, can strict liability and negligence
live peacefully together? Can they share jurisdiction over
accidentally caused harms? Or, as Jeremiah Smith thundered
forty years ago, are they irreducibly inconsistent with each
other? Luthringer v. Moore is an instance in point. How
does a court go about deciding whether the activity in question-exterminating--calls for application of the one principle or the other? As we know, the California court fell back
upon Sec. 519 of the Restatement' and found the activity
3 RESTATEMENT,

TORTS

§

519

Miscarriage

of

Ultrahazardous

Activities

Carefully Carried On. Except as stated in §§ 521-4, one who carries on an
ultrahazardous activity is liable to another whose person, land or chattels
the actor should recognize as likely to be harmed by the unpreventable
miscarriage of the activity for harm resulting thereto from that which
makes the activity ultrahazardous, although the utmost care is exercised
to prevent the harm.
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ultra-hazardous and not within the common usage exception.
I admire the Restatement's effort as a tour de force to unify
the islands of strict liability never engulfed by negligence.
If, however, we read it as saying there are some cases where
strict liability is appropriate and other situations where it
is not, difficulties abound: (a) It seems to me that all
activity is ultra-hazardous in the Restatement's sense; all
activity carries a margin of unpreventable miscarriage. (b)
If liability seriously depends on the incidence of unpreventable harm, how can this criterion be tested in litigation? What
must a defendant show to establish that his activity isn't
that dangerous? How would one compare statistically the
incidence of unpreventable harm in operating a tractor, an
automobile, an oil well, a railroad, or a Coca-Cola plant?
(c) When does an activity come within the common usage
exception? How many millions of miles of airplane travel
must occur annually before the airplane qualifies?
Thus, I would suggest that the criterion is unworkable.
And there is a further difficulty. Assume for the moment
that we have successfully identified exterminating as ultrahazardous. Why does this justify placing the burden upon
it of compensating for unpreventable miscarriages? The
harm is not intentional and the activity is, on hypothesis,
socially useful. Why then is it not entitled to the same "privilege" for non-negligently caused harm as are other activities?
In repeating these well-worn queries, I have attempted
to keep loss-shifting criteria out of the discussion. Of course,
Sec. 519 can be justified as a half-way house to an overall
system of absolute liability; and on that view it can never
be an error to classify an activity as ultra-hazardous. My
question is the doctrinally pure one, such considerations apart,
of whether there is a limited category of activities for which
strict liability is appropriate and another category for which
it is not. As a footnote, I would add that if Sec. 519 is to
be read as implicitly embodying criteria of superior risk
bearing, it is not apparent that more dangerous activities
carry with them greater capacity to distribute risks.
I turn now to another familiar doctrinal difficulty with
strict liability. How strict is it? Once we are committed to
it for a given type of conduct, what consequences remain
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beyond its scope? Here Madsen v. East Jordan IrrigationCo.
is illustrative. Perhaps the conduct of the mother mink was
not as idiosyncratic as the Utah court assumed, but the case
makes its point: absolute liability is not unlimited liability.
And if it is not, there is not only the difficulty of where and
when to limit it, but also the difficulty of distinguishing it
from other forms of limited liability, such as liability for
negligence.
My last point is illustrated sufficiently by a case such as
Peck v. Tribune. It goes to the reach of the strict liability
principle across the field of tort. Why has it traditionally
been found in defamation? With all deference to Justice
Holmes' explanation in the Peck case, surely it is difficult
to regard communication as an ultra-hazardous activity
carrying a threat of serious harm, to say nothing of the
common usage exception. And there is the additional incongruity of finding strict liability in an area where law generally is inhibited by the Anglo-American commitment to the
freedom of speech and freedom of press. Nor, if we jump
ahead again to risk distribution notions, does defamation
appear to me to offer a particularly good occasion for the
application of such criteria. Would not, for example, a
proposal to license publishers only on the condition that they
carry libel insurance raise serious policy misgivings?
Behind such queries is the old question, appropriate at
least for jurisprudence auspices, of whether, seventy-five
years after Holmes' Common Law, tort doctrine is not still
a haphazard collection of historical accidents with no unifying
theory. In any event, the flavor of strict liability in defamation is different and suggestive of a few final observations,
both as to the possible reasons for strict liability here and
as to the system's elaboration of it. The most attractive
explanation for the defamation rule is that since contributory
negligence could play little or no role in defamation and
since the use of words is a deliberate readily controlled activity, most instances of defamation do, in fact, involve at least
negligence. Hence the role of strict liability is simply to
avoid the complicating of the law that would result from
the effort to isolate the very occasional case of non-negligent
defamation. On this view the introduction of a negligence
limitation would be a too expensive indulgence in equity. This,
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then, would be sort of a penumbra theory of strict liability;
and it serves at least to indicate how versatile the rationalizations for strict liability may be.
My final observation is somewhat at war with this
rationale. It simply calls attention to how different the
structure of the law of defamation is from that of negligence.
The route to equity has been by way of an elaborate set of
privileges-privileges so extensive that it is doubtful whether
strict liability is in the end the rule or the exception in
defamation. One can at least briefly wonder what the law
of negligence would have looked like had it followed the same
line of development.
Perhaps I have been less explicit than I should about the
relevance of values to evaluation of a concept such as strict
liability. I will add at least this. The justifications and
meanings of so general an idea vary with its context. Hence,
strict liability calls into play a variety of possible values.
The values may be the values of simplicity, in a rule of law
that we act at our peril as against the quixotic equities of
limiting liability to negligence. They may be in the special
simplicity of the penumbra theory of liability suggested for
defamation. They may be in the justice of measuring liability by the incidence of unpreventable harms. They may
be in the subtle unjust enrichment found in the Lake Erie
case. Or the values may be those of socializing accident
losses and other misfortunes through some compulsory use of
the insurance principle and may lead to such extra-tort issues
as compulsory thrift, the scope of state activity, the marginal
utility of money, justice in taxation, and even the problem of
poverty.
I end then much where I began. Strict liability is a
key concept in tort law, the tracing of which immediately
brings to the fore the principal policy issues in tort law and
the principal gaps in tort theory. I am aware that in this
brief comment I have done little more than raise a few
familiar questions in the hope of shifting the risks of seriously discussing them to others on this round table.
(Professor Brown:) The third, and final, paper will be
presented by Dean Joseph T. Tinnelly of St. John's University School of Law.
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I think that a prefatory word might be in order. I am
certainly not competent at all in the field of torts and am
afraid that Dr. Brown may have confused interest with
competence in the field of jurisprudence, but in the hope of
at least stirring up some discussion later, I'll venture to
say a few words on the subject.
It is evident that the doctrine of strict liability is frequently inseparable from the quest for financially responsible
defendants. The Sorenson case illustrates this point very
clearly. As you will recall, in the Sorenson case, the defendant
radio station, which had broadcast a political speech, was
required by the Federal Communications Commission to give
equal time to the opponents. During the course of the opponent's speech, he uttered some libelous remarks. In an
action for libel, the defendant radio station was held liable
for defamatory statements uttered by this political speaker
and this broadcast over the company's station, notwithstanding the fact that the statutory provisions prohibited censorship of the material, so that it had to broadcast it and it
could not censor it. This seems, therefore, a perfect case
of a search for a financially responsible defendant.
If the person uttering the libel had been a millionaire,
it is questionable if the plaintiff's attorney would have
pressed the issue of whether the broadcasting company was
liable for a speech which the Federal Communications Commission had directed it to broadcast and which it was not
permitted to censor.
This search for a financially responsible defendant has
been a potent factor in the development of the reasoning
which underlies Workmen's Compensation. Yet this search
has not been pursued so ruthlessly as to fix liability on a
defendant solely because of his ability or greater ability to
bear the costs. Otherwise the search for a defendant would
hinge upon an accounting, and the more affluent of possible
defendants would be burdened with the liability. Obviously
the American sense of justice and fairness would be outraged
by such a proposal. In fact, the doctrine of the Sorenson case
has already been limited or rejected in a number of states by
legislation or decisional law.
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Yesterday, in his invocation, Cardinal Stritch prayed
that God might deliver us from the errors of the pragmatists
or from the errors of the positivists. Fortunately, most pragmatists and positivists of my acquaintance are better than
their philosophies, and some of them, in fact, are themselves
excellent proof of the reality of natural law since they accept
and practice absolute principles of justice which they might
reject or ignore in theory.
On the other. hand, Cardinal Stritch emphasized the
errors of the pragmatists and positivists. He did not, nor
would he, deny that there are vast areas of the law in which
the reason for adopting an ordinance or a statute must be
more or less pragmatic. The most orthodox or even the most
extreme advocate of a natural law philosophy would not
contend that there is, or can be, an objective, perfect traffic
code, for instance, or motor vehicle act which should be
adopted in all parts of the world without change. The
natural law principle which requires one to exercise his
rights or use his property so as not to injure the rights
or property of another leads to the necessity for some
sort of a traffic law. But the details of the law are the
province of the practical man, guided, but not coerced, by
the natural law. Take, for example, the English rule of
keeping to the left side of the road. I am told that the
low-hanging branches on either side of the early English
turnpikes made it necessary for stagecoach drivers to direct
the coaches so that their whips would not become entangled
in the branches; and since most of the drivers were righthanded in swinging the whips, the coaches tended to travel
on the left side of the road, and the custom of passing on
the left finally became firmly fixed.
There is no absolute rule of natural law which prescribes
the side of the road on which traffic must pass. This is an
area in which practical and pragmatic considerations are
important. On the other hand, the natural law is not completely excluded. It would be a violation of the natural law
for a group of the members of Parliament with substantial
investments in Ford or General Motors to bring about a
change in the traffic law which would require the present
automobiles to be replaced with left-hand drive models if
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the primary motive of the change was the self-enrichment of
individual M. P.'s.
So, in a matter of strict liability, there is ample room
and serious need for practical and pragmatic considerations.
The natural and moral law can be of help in many ways,
but the area of strict liability seems to be one in which there
is special need for experiment and experience.
The civil law is limited by the natural law in that it
cannot command what the natural law forbids nor forbid
what the natural law commands. The role of the civil law
is at least threefold:
1) To interpret what the natural law commands or
forbids, or to supplement it by appropriate procedures, or
to apply sanctions, such as the child welfare laws.
2) To determine what the natural law leaves undetermined; for instance, how shall the decedent's obligations to
the dependents be fulfilled if he dies intestate.
3) To impose obligations for the general welfare which
are in accord with the natural law; for instance, prescriptive
rights, the validity of contracts by minors, property rights
of spouses, such as community property, etc.
The civil law cannot bind in conscience unless it conforms to the prescriptions of the natural law, e.g., to bind in
conscience, the law must, among other things:
1) Be not opposed to Divine or natural law.
2) Have for its ends the common good. And yet it must
recognize the rights of property of individuals so
that a resultant profit for many is not sufficient
reason for taking the property of an individual except
under certain conditions of police powers.
3) Pertain to matters within the jurisdiction of the
legislator.
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4) Distribute honors and burdens or rewards and punishments proportionately and fairly.
The history of the development of the law of torts in
Anglo-American law, running the gamut from the trespass
on the case to negligence to strict liability, may well have
been reflecting, even unconsciously, some of the precepts
of the natural law which impose obligations of restitution
in some cases without reference to the civil law. While in
others it imposes no obligation in conscience until after a
burden has been imposed or determined by the civil law.
An employer who has taken every precaution to protect his
employee from injury on the job is not bound in conscience
by the virtue of justice to compensate that employee for
injuries sustained during the course of his employment where
there was no negligence whatsoever. Yet, the natural law
recognizes the jurisdiction of the civil law to impose such an
obligation upon the employer; and once it has been imposed
by the civil law, that obligation will oblige in conscience.
The civil law has jurisdiction to regulate and even to
forbid certain occupations which are so inherently dangerous
as to constitute a threat to the rights of others, no matter
how carefully the agent may perform those acts. The civil
law may also impose the burden of carrying insurance against
harm from such acts even though there is no fault in the
moral, but only in the legal, sense. Thus, compulsory automobile insurance can be justified not only as a means of
distributing the risk but also of imposing the liability or
responsibility which the natural law does not impose, but
leaves to the discretion of the civil legislator.
It seems clear, however, that not all civil laws are
justifiable uses of the power of regulation which is inherent
in civil government. The Sorenson case, (the broadcast of
a libel), seems unfair inasmuch as it shifts the risk to one
who cannot avoid either the act or the method of acting
without serious consequences. It seems that the extra-hazardous concept of the Restatement is a justifiable method, but
not necessarily the best method of producing the effect.
If all of this seems inconclusive, it is due in great part
to the nature of the problem. It is difficult to say how many

LOYOLA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. IX

million miles we must fly airplanes before taking them out
of the extra-hazardous, unusual or uncommon category. But
the line must probably be drawn sometime, and fairness
would suggest that it be done by legislation rather than by
the courts. Yet, no legislation is going to be able to foresee4
the myriad possibilities, such as arose in the mink case.
Therefore, perfection and completeness in this series can
never be obtained and should not be expected.
There is just one final word I would like to say inasmuch
as we are partaking in a law school convention-a word on
education. I believe that a course in equity should be a part
of every curriculum-not a course on the development of the
growth and decline of an historical court, but a course in
the methods by which intelligent and experienced judges
have attempted to rectify injustices in the law and to develop
new concrete concepts of how social justice and legal justice
can be reduced to practice. For this is an area in which
students can and must get a feel for the philosophy of equity
and justice, even though the modification which seems desirable should probably be brought about by legislation.
DISCUSSION FOLLOWING THE READING OF THE
PAPERS AT THE ROUND TABLE MEETING ON
JURISPRUDENCE-2:30 P.M.-WEST LOUNGEEDGEWATER BEACH HOTEL-SATURDAY,
DEC. 29, 1956, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS.
DISCUSSION LED BY DR. BRENDAN F. BROWN
(Professor Brown) Thank you very much, Dean Tinnelly.
(Brown) What were the seven values, Professor James,
which you enumerated in your paper?
(Prof. James) They were the dignity of the individual;
the physical well being of the individual; a wide freedom of
speech, especially about matters that concern the public;
the possession or receipt of property or money; the engaging
Madsen v. East Jordan Irrigation Co., as cited in the introductory statement.
4
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in lawful activities for the production of goods or services,
or entertainment; the continuing development of the arts and
sciences to advance such production; and the satisfying of
the prevailing community sense of justice or fairness.
(Brown) Professor Shuman, are you satisfied with this
enumeration of values?
(Professor Samuel I. Shuman, from Harvard University
Law School) I wonder why the enumeration of these values
seems to offer some basis for what we call the Jurisprudential
Analysis of Strict Liability. Indeed, as I read your paper
and hear your remarks, it seems to me that you soon. abandon
these as criteria to which one should make an appeal, and
that instead you talk of marginal utility, certainty, and calculability as the decisive criteria.
(Brown) Professor James, do you feel that you have
been inconsistent in this respect?
(James) I don't think that all of the values come into
all of the aspects of it. Certainly I don't think that freedom
of speech is involved in accident cases. Now you mentionedwhat were the specific things that you said-well, the marginal utility of money has to do with the psychological satisfaction of the individual about the receipt of the possession of
money. It's an aspect of that.
(Brown) Do you agree, Professor Shuman?
(Shuman) Well, contrary to marginal utilities, economics would also be an aspect of that value, so that the appeal
to marginal utility in no way exemplifies that principle as
other than the fact that it could be included within it; but
so could its contrary. So why appeal to the so-called value
since it supports both what you assert and its contrary? The
same would be true, for example, of the dignity of man.
(Brown) Professor James, I think perhaps it may be
well if you will elucidate that statement in your paper to the
effect that these values can be regarded merely as useful
points of departure for analysis. What would be the implica-
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tions of that? I think perhaps Professor Shuman may be
attacking that point of view.
(James) I am not quite sure that I understand what
Professor Shuman is saying.
(Brown) Are these really absolute values, or are they
just tentative, convenient things to hang your hat on, as it
were, in this discussion? Professor Shuman, is that your
point of view?
(Shuman) Yes.
(James) Well, I think they were more the latter.
(Brown) Professor Parker, what is your position? Do
you subscribe to the fact that these values are merely interests, feelings, just tentative things to proceed on, or do
they have any real vital significance-these seven values?
(Professor Reginald Parker, from Willamette University Law School) I don't know. It strikes me that in the
course of this discussion with all three papers, (although
Professor Kalven has alluded to the problem), confusion has
taken place - a very frequent confusion, however - between sanction and obligation. The legal order imposes
sanctions for wrongs, and then it strikes us as unjust
to impose a sanction on somebody who has not committed a
wrong. But that does not prevent the legal order from imposing obligations or legal duties on other grounds than the
commission of a wrong, such as to maintain one's childrenthat's not a sanction or punishment; for if you have children,
that would be a very far-fetched view. Or, respondeat superior, a man is liable for the torts of his employee because
he has the employee, although he is guilty of no negligence
whatsoever. You can call it enterprise liability, to use the
modern word. The Sorenson case, that's the broadcasting
case, can be justified, it can be quite justifiably understood
under that theory. Somebody runs a broadcasting station,
and therefore he has to pay people who get injured thereby,
regardless of his fault. It is an obligation he incurs.
(Brown) Professor Davitt?
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(Rev. Thomas A. Davitt, S.J., from Marquette University Law School) I'd like to ask a question that ties in both
with Professor Shuman's and Professor Parker's statements,
and with Professor James' values. One of his principal values
is the dignity of the individual. I am wondering whether or
not in Professor James' mind that stands as a basis for responsibility. If it does, it seems to me that responsibility is
essentially individual, and then we have the problem of
justifying a shift of responsibility from the individual.
(Brown) Professor James, what is your precise meaning
of the phrase, "the dignity of the individual"? Does it have
variable content here?
(James) Yes, it certainly would. I was thinking of it
narrowly, largely in connection with the problem of def amation, where the dignity of the individual is invaded that
way. However, I can see an invasion of the dignity of the
individual by allowing an uncompensated accident victim
not to get care, cure, and rehabilitation, and having his family
pauperized; and the preservation of that would be a worthwhile objective. Of course, there would be other things that
would have to be balanced.
(Brown) Well, then, Professor James, in ultimate analysis, all of these values, then, do depend on the intrinsic worth
and dignity of the individual in that sense, would you say?
(James) Yes, I would accept that.
(Brown) You are taking the dignity of the individual,
then, rather in a subultimate sense?
(James) I was, that is, as I put it in the paper, yes.
(Brown) Now, Professor Kalven, what is your opinion
as to the basic moral value underlying this doctrine of liability
without fault?
(Professor Kalven) I think I'd come back to Professor
Parker-that it is important that we keep in mind which
aspect of strict liability we're talking about. If we go back
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and talk about strict liability as an individual affair, I think
there is no great moral justification for it, and frequently it
falls before the superior equity of the negligence criterion and
the notion that some personal responsibility must be involved
before you will penalize a man for damages. If, however,
you shift to-let me make the point this way-if you take
what the English started to do when the Labor Government
came in after the war, that is, you're not thinking about tort
at all. You're thinking about the kinds of misfortunes people
have: they get sick, they get unemployed, and so forth, and
you start a widespread special insurance scheme. Suppose
you were able to be a little more generous than the English
were able to be with their awards, and you find out that, by
inadvertence, you have made the traditional tort law superfluous. It seems to me that it is a forced reinterpretation to
say that we must take head on the issue of whether personal
responsibility makes sense or not.
(Brown) Professor Kalven, do you think the doctrine of
liability without fault has any relation to the idea of social
justice?
(Kalven) It -

yes -

in fact, I think that is probably

fairly good theory for the modern case for it.
(Brown) Professor Shuman, what is your opinion of
that?
(Shuman) Indeed, I would have thought that what Mr.
James and others who advocate strict liability are doing is
substituting some notion of social morality for the individual
morality which was supposed to underlie tort liability before
the further expansion of strict liability.
(Brown) Professor Cowan?
(Professor Thomas A. Cowan, from Rutgers University
Law School) I was wondering what Professor James would
say when he found that the dignity of the individual might
conflict with the social welfare of injured parties; in other
words, the dilemma of individual interests clashing with
social interests. It did seem to me that whereas there was
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lip service paid to the individual interests, the whole theory,
as developed, was the development of the liability of groups.
(Brown) Professor Davitt, is that your view?
(Davitt) I want to shift back to something we were
discussing with Professor Kalven.
(Brown) Very well, go ahead.
(Davitt) I want to ask Professor Kalven if we are in
this situation. We have really a double standard in torts.
We have a standard liability based on negligence, and we
have a standard of strict liability based on risk bearing.
If that's true, do you think it could be applied to crimes also?
(Brown) Are you asking the question, Professor Davitt,
whether the doctrine of liability without fault is more justly
applied to tort law than criminal law?
(Davitt) No. I'm asking, are we admitting there's a
double standard of liability and, if so, why couldn't it apply
reasonably to criminal law-a double standard of responsibility?
(Brown) What do you mean by a double standard,
Professor Davitt?
(Davitt) Well, a man is liable if he is negligent; he is
also liable if he is not negligent.
(Brown) Professor Kalven, is there a double standard,
in other words?
(Kalven) Well, I think not in the interesting sense in
which Father Davitt would be suggesting. That is, this
seems to me to be a question I am not sure of the answer of.
I would like to argue for the moment the position that personal
fault is not really put in issue by contemporary notions of,
absolute liability. It is not so much that there is a double
standard but that we look at the matter entirely differently.
In a sense you are saying there is no great difference between
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cancer and being hit by an automobile. And if that's the
problem you decide to address yourself to, you've just gotten
out of the torts field altogether.
(Brown) Professor Chroust, do you think there is any
integrating principle which would integrate and give significance to these two ideas: negligence versus liability without fault?
(Professor Anton Hermann Chroust, from Notre Dame
University Law School) I don't know. Frankly, I don't know.
(Brown) Do you think they're contradictory-inconsistent-or can they be integrated?
(Chroust) Well, I suppose there's always a certainty
in law that we deal with problems among the paradox. You
have a social interest. We live in a crowded society. However,
we still carry on notions or carry with us notions which were
developed in a less crowded society. That's a form of altruism.
The idea of liability based on negligence may have applied to
an individualistic society, while today, liability without fault
may be in keeping with a kind of so-called social morality,
if you want to call it social morality; namely, that society has
an interest that none of its members should suffer an accident for which nobody can really be held responsible.
(Brown) Professor Shuman, do you find any principle
of integration for these two concepts: negligence versus liability without fault?
(Shuman) The only integration I can recognize is that
social utility expects to be achieved by using either principle
to further achieve some more basic "value", to use Professor
James' language, which is why I wonder what he means by
"value" in these contexts.
(Brown) Professor Parker?
(Parker) I think I can go back-would like to go back
to Father Davitt's remark about the double standard. I think
it can be answered. Criminal law imposes sanctions, and it

1957-58] SYMPOSIUM ON STRICT LIABILITY

53

would be immoral if criminal law would impose a sanction
upon somebody whose fault it was not, who committed a
crime only externally, but wasn't at fault for some reason
or other. Civil law, on the other hand, imposes obligations,
some of which are in pursuance of a breach of another obligation-and then they can be called sanctions. You didn't
do as you ought to have done; hence, you pay damages. You
breached your contract, and the law punished you. But it
imposes on persons a variety of many other obligations which
are not sanctions, and they should not constantly be confused.
Strict liability might, if the situation so warrants, well be
classified as a civil law obligation, but not as a sanctionyou are not punished for anything-but because you run an
enterprise, because you are somebody's boss, or because you
are a citizen and have to pay taxes, and so forth. I think that's
the best way of integrating the two.
(Brown) Professor Kalven, do you think the reasonable
man might integrate these two concepts?
(Kalven) I'd like to say to that, Dr. Brown, that I think
rather than the question of being one of integrating them,
we ought to find some tension between them. I think the
more interesting question is whether they require integration.
In terms of what we have said so far, it seems to me they
do not. Not that I confess that I am utterly confident of
that answer-nor if I may just say one additional thingI don't mean to dispose of, by my way of putting this, the
real policy issues that are left over if you decide that you
are going in for some scheme of socializing losses-that is,
you still have the problem of deciding who's going to pay for
it. And with all deference to Professor Parker's distinction,
which I like, it may turn out that in the end the obligation is
a trick name for a sanction.
(Parker) Yes.
(Brown) Dean Tinnelly, do you think that the reasonable
man might be an integrating principle here, or do you have
some other integrating principle?
(Dean Tinnelly) Well, it would seem to me that in liability because of fault we have just one of a series of reasons
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for which we would impose an obligation which would be
either a result of the power-an exercise of the power-of
the state to enforce an obligation that was due from commutative justice or from legal justice. And it is this new term
of social justice, which seems to be the development of legal
justice, that is involved in this. It seems to me that we don't
have to integrate, but that we do have to find some reason
other than ability to pay in order to impose an obligation.
(Brown) Dean Tinnelly, would you find the integrating
principle in the objective natural law?
(Dean Tinnelly) Well, yes and no. Yes to the extent
that the natural law guides the civil law. Yes, to the extent
that it is the obligation of the legislature or the government
to take care of anyone that is injured who is otherwise unable
to take care of himself. In other words, if in the form of
compulsory automobile insurance or taxation, or a form of
charity or welfare, it seems to me that either would satisfy
the demands of the natural law.
(Brown) Professor Shuman?
(Shuman) It seems to me that the field of natural law
in no way helps us in attempting to justify strict liability.
For, as I think Dean Tinnelly accurately pointed out, natural
'law is not particularly concerned with what have been normally called "instrumental value judgments," but perhaps with
inherent or intrinsic value judgments. And that's why I
say that there must be some basis for the integration of
these two principles as regards the philosophic question involved in tort liability.
(Brown) Dean Tinnelly, do we have to relate this problem of liability without fault to the natural law?
(Tinnelly) We do to the extent that we couldn't violate
a positive principle of the natural law. For instance, if the
only reason why I should be held liable is because I have
enough money to pay the judgment, that certainly would not
be sufficient.
(Brown) Professor Cowan, what is your response to
this?
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(Cowan) I would like to ask Dean Tinnelly what is the
difference between a natural law and a Restatement of Torts
version?
(Brown) Dean Tinnelly?
(Laughter from Dean Tinnelly) I'm certainly glad that
I said I was not a torts expert. If you will tell me what the(Brown) Professor Kalven, can you give us any idea
as to the content of that Restatement, of that section?
(Kalven) Resta-beg pardon?
(Brown) Will you give us the(Cowan) Section 592. 5
(Brown) Professor Cowan, do you have any-?
(Cowan) As I heard Father Tinnelly's discussion of
what the Natural Law would and would not approve of, it
seemed to me to coincide pretty well with the ordinary view
of the case laws in this country. I'm wondering if we're all
practicing natural law by ear.
(Brown) Professor Davitt, do you want to address
yourself to(Davitt) I think that with a few exceptions, as for
instance, the Sorenson case, the Restatement would coincide
with the principles of the natural law. But I would say that
the Restatement does not codify the natural law.
(Brown) Professor Davitt?
(Davitt) Along the same line, I was wondering if Dean
Tinnelly would say whether or not he thinks, according to
TORTS § 592 Husband And Wife-A husband or a wife is
absolutely privileged to publish to the other spouse false and defamatory
matter of a third person.
5 RESTATEMENT,
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his standards of natural law, that shifting the loss according
to risk-bearing ability is one of the precepts of the natural law.
(Brown) Dean Tinnelly?
(Tinnelly) I would say that is one of the areas in which
the civil law might well intervene-that that might be something that the natural law would leave to the civil law either
to determine or to make more concrete in evidence.
(Brown) Professor James, do you want to address yourself to this particular point?
(James) Yes. I just wanted to say that it seems to me
that in the case-kinds of cases-I was talking about it
wasn't so much a matter of shifting the loss as a matter of
widely distributing the loss after its being shifted among
the beneficiaries of the enterprise that created the hazards
that caused the loss, and that certainly I take it from what
Father Tinnelly has said that there'd be nothing inconsistent
between that and the natural law.
(Brown) Professor Chroust?
(Chroust) I would like to ask Professor James a question. In his comment on a case, Donoghue v. Stevenson, an
English case, Professor Winfield, in his treatise-text--on
torts, advised the plaintiff-you know the facts of the case-?
(James) Yes.
(Brown) Professor Chroust, perhaps you ought to state
the facts, first, for the benefit of those who are present.
(Chroust) Well, a lady buys from a retailer a bottle of
ginger beer-it's an English case-and finds a snail inside
it-in the bottle-which caused her great discomfort, and
-that's about all-these are the facts. But Professor Winfield advised the plaintiff not to sue the retailer but the
manufacturer for the simple reason that she is more likely
to recover and recover more from the manufacturer. I ask
the question: Is that shifting because of distribution, or
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shifting because of the greater ability to pay more substantially?
(Brown) Professor James?
(James) Well, let's not confuse two things. One is the
tactical consideration for the plaintiff's lawyer. Now, of
course the plaintiff's lawyer is going to advise suit at the
point where there's the greatest ability to pay, and where the
jury is likely to give the greatest damages. I wasn't thinking
of the tactical point of view, but of the kinds of considerations
that ought to persuade either the legislature or the courts
through a common law process to administer the law; and
there, it doesn't seem to me that the individual ability to pay
is the primary consideration. It's a question of a broad social
distribution of the risks; and the first point, the first incidence of liability, is relatively insignificant as long as it's a
good conduit, and as long as it's fair to ask that person to
pay a part in the distribution of the risks.
(Brown) Professor Chroust, do you want to push it
further?
(Chroust) I'll try to get back to that case because Professor Winfield was not representing the plaintiff, and he
merely made a scholarly comment in his book; so, therefore,
this was not a tactical advice but a-it seems to be a jurisprudential advice, if you want to use that term.
(James) Well, perhaps I don't remember what Winfield said. I misunderstood then what you said. I thought
that you were quoting Winfield as saying that this was what
a plaintiff's lawyer should do.
(Brown) Is this a matter of social justice, natural law,
something else?
(James) To me it's a matter of social utility, but I don't
think it's inconsistent with natural law.
(Brown) Professor Kalven, do you want to come in on
this?

LOYOLA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. IX

(Kalven) Let me pick up a little that Professor Chroust
said before and perhaps add a little something to this last
exchange between Mr. James and Mr. Shuman. It seems to
me that the real use of the ability-to pay-principle here is
not in the ad hoc fashion that you drag a rich man in off
the street and make him pay because he is wealthier, but in
some deliberate advance use of it; it is almost a legislative
principle. And that in fact the-the question I think, really
is whether the legal system ought to concern itself with creating in advance an ability to pay for accidents. That might
involve no rich people but simply wide use of the principle of
insurance. Now let me say one more thing. The principle
here may turn out to be different from the kind of thing we've
been talking about. That is, it might turn out to be one principle of compulsory thrift. The state might get so concerned
with the improvidence of people that may suffer accidents
in society that it decides that it is better to force them to save
in advance so that when the accident does come they're ready
for it, via the insurance fund.
(Brown) Professor Parker?
(Parker) I just want to make one comment on this accident business. Why is it not equally possible to leave the
risk where it is-in other words, with the victim who was
hurt by a driver who was not at fault-and have him have
accident insurance? Why does everybody always talk of the
driver who is quite capable of buying liability insurance and
can shift the risk? Why can't the victim shift the risk to
his accident insurance?
(Kalven) I think that's the right question. I think the
genuine questions of policy that are raised here are not in
opposition to fault notions, but in terms of the possible ways
in which you might decide to distribute, in a sense, the
insurance costs among the-along various possible lines. And
thot is the genuine issue then that we might talk to.
(Brown) Professor Davitt?
(Davitt) Well, I was only going to point up that very
fact-that insurance is not the main question here. There
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is no problem in regard to either the plaintiff's or defendant's
having insurance. The main problem that we have to discuss
is, granting no insurance, could you shift liability to someone
who is a better risk-bearer?
(Brown) Professor Kalven?
(Kalven) I think the question really is, Father Davitt,
whether the state should permit that to arise. Isn't the
question rather whether the state should exploit the insurance
principle in advance so as to eliminate the situation which
otherwise would be a sharp moral dilemma?
(Brown) Professor Davitt?
(Davitt) All I wanted to say is it seems to me that the
insurance idea is a peripheral thing. There is nothing wrong
with insurance one way or the other.
(Brown) Professor Kalven?
(Kalven) Well, it's not so much that there's nothing
wrong with it-isn't it-mightn't there be something very
good about it that makes it legitimate to me-I'm not sure
about this but at least the argument would go this way-that
it isn't that we object to the existence of insurance, or are
ignoring it when it happens to occur, but whether the state
couldn't exploit the fact that insurance happens to existit's in a sense a brilliantly useful institution-and decide that
it becomes now one of the real policy obligations of the state
to see that the insurance principle is properly exploited.
(Davitt) Well, I would agree with you on that.
(Brown) Professor James, do you believe that the case
of Vincent v. Stinehour, Vermont, 1835, that horse and buggy
case, was justly decided on the basis of negligence, or should
it have been decided on the basis of liability without fault?
(James) No, I think that it was justly decided on the
basis of negligence because it-in those days, there was no
machinery for effecting a distribution of this loss among
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the users of horses and buggies. If anybody had to pay in
that case, it would be Stinehour himself out of his own pocket.
Now that does pose an entirely different problem, but I agree
entirely with what Professor Kalven has said; that the question now is whether we ought not to try to fashion our system
so it effects a broad distribution of this risk-this lossamong the beneficiaries of the enterprises that cause it.
(Brown) Would anybody believe that the Stinehour
case should have been decided on the basis of liability without
fault? Professor Cowan?
(Cowan) I'm sorry. I didn't follow that question.
(Brown) In other words, in the Stinehour case, could
you argue that the horse was a dangerous creature, that
there was liability without fault, therefore, as I think counsel
for the plaintiff did argue?
(Cowan) I don't know. I suppose the Indians regarded
the horse as a dangerous instrumentality at one time. I
don't know that I have very much to offer this audience by
attempting to exercise my imagination in trying to envisage
how that case could be an instance of liability without fault,
but I do have a question that I should like to have answered
that I did raise before, and that is this: what would Professor
James do when there is a conflict between the value of individual dignity on one hand, and the social desirability of
repairing reparable harms on the other. For example, it used
to be thought beneath human dignity to sue for an injury
unless it fell within one of the very narrow areas of tort
liability. Indeed, we find that a great deal of the opposition
to Workmen's Compensation and the vast spread of group
responsibility are because they put an end to human dignity.
(Brown) Professor James, we're back again on this
balancing of the interests or equities, as it were. In other
words, would the feelings of social justice, or the feelings of
fairness in the community have to yield if they went against
what we thought was the intrinsic dignity of the individual?
(James) Well, I suppose in one sense of course not. I
suppose that the executed criminal has his dignity offended;
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and certainly in my own conclusion that, in agreement with
Father Tinnelly, that Sorenson v. Wood was wrongly decided,
I am elevating the social interest in freedom of speech over
the indignity of Sorenson, who was offended by the libel.
(Brown) Do we all agree that the criminal does have
his intrinsic dignity violated by capital punishment? Do we
all agree with that?
(Shuman) No!
(Brown) Professor Shuman, will you take issue, please?
(Shuman) I just don't understand why Mr. James would
say the dignity of the criminal is violated, unless by dignity
he's now translating dignity into some kind of subjective
evaluation, a situation from the individual and not from
social evaluation, which seems to me to underlie all the other
values which you posited on the first page of your analysis.
(Brown) Professor James, is this a weasel word, this
"dignity"? Would you amplify it, please?
(James) I don't understand what you're talking about.
As far as I can see, in any sense that is real to me (and I
don't speak in philosophical terms), the family of the man
that is executed for murder suffers the greatest indignity.
Now maybe it's just that they should, but if they don't suffer
indignity, I don't know what it is.
(Brown) Professor Cowan?
(Cowan) I don't know whether this is in order or not,
but I wonder if I could put Professor Kalven on the spot for
a moment.
(Brown) Well, couldn't we answer the question of this
"dignity" before we go on to that?
(Cowan) All right.
(Brown) Does anybody want to address themselves further? Dean Tinnelly?
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(Tinnelly) I doubt if we could agree on a definition of
the dignity of man.
(Brown) Do we all agree that we cannot agree on the
dignity of man? (Laughter).
(Shuman) No!
(Brown) Professor Shuman, will you proceed?
(Shuman) If you take this position and reduce philosophic questions to questions of definition, it seems to me
you are not only throwing the baby out into the water; you're
shooting the baby's mother and father as well.
(Kalven) That's an indignity, finally, isn't it?
(Brown) Professor Shuman?
(Shuman) That is an indignity of philosophy. I would
suggest that there is a basis for understanding what Mr.
James means when he speaks about dignity, and his reply to
my question suggested that by dignity he now did mean some
sense of individual feeling in response to perhaps a socially
justified course of conduct.
(Brown) Does a criminal who commits a very serious
crime withdraw himself, as it were, from the order of
rationality?
(Shuman) I would suppose some criminals surely do,
and in most criminal cases we treat them differently.
(Brown) And then the idea of the intrinsic dignity is
ignored because of withdrawal from the order of rationality,
is that true?
(Shuman) I would suppose rationality would be a condition for dignity of the human being.
(Brown) Then we could understand it on that basis?
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(Shuman) If you don't understand it on that basis, I'd
like you to tell what the dignity of a dog is.
(Brown) Does anybody want to tell us what the dignity
of a dog is. (Laughter).
(Tinnelly) I would say he has no dignity at all in the
same sense that a man does.
(Brown) What's the difference, Father Tinnelly?
(Tinnelly) I'd say that the dignity of man depends upon
his essential difference from an animal, in the simple sense
of the word. If he's a rational animal, he has an immortal
soul, and he lives in a destiny beyond this world.
(Brown) Professor Davitt-do you want to come in on
this?
(Davitt) I just wanted to ask one question of Professor
James be2ore Professor Cowan discusses what he wants to
with Professor Kalven. To get back to the Stinehour case,
did I understand you correctly to say that you thought it
was properly decided on the basis of negligence?
(Brown) Professor James?
(James) Yes.
(Brown) Professor Davitt?
(Davitt) But that you thought if the structure of insurance was then available perhaps it should have been
decided otherwise on the basis of strict liability?
(Brown) Professor James?
(James) Yes, that's right.
(Brown) Professor Davitt?
(Davitt) In other words, the basis for these decisions,
then is the availibility of, let's say, money and material resources to pay the loss, and not responsibility, ultimately.
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(Brown) Professor James?
(James) Yes, what I say is-what-my position is
I feel this kind of loss ought to be broadly distributed
the beneficiaries of the activity that causes the loss,
that the law ought to guide it toward that direction
put pressure on the use of such devices as insurance.

that
over
and
and

(Brown) Professor Davitt?
(Davitt) Well, what I'm getting at, though, is something
slightly more basic, and that is whether or not in torts we
are going to take, as the basis of liability, blameworthiness,
even though insurance is available, or not take it if insurance
is available. You seem to say that if insurance is...
(James) Available.
(Davitt) -available,
be a deciding factor.

then blameworthiness should not

(Brown) Professor James?
(James) No, I don't take the position that the mere
availability of insurance ought to be determining. What Ithe kind of situation in which it seems to me that it ought
to be determining is where you have accidental loss caused
by conduct that is not on the whole morally blameworthy, and
which is a more or less inevitable consequence of the ,activity
of this enterprise. That kind of a situation.
(Brown) Professor James, if the case of Vincent v.
Stinehour, that is the horse and buggy case, had been decided
on the doctrine of liability without fault, would that have been
unjust in your opinion?
(James) Yes, it would.
(Brown) Do we all agree that it would have been unjust?
(James) That is, given the then context.
(Brown) Professor Parker?
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(Parker) If that is so, then why do we not agree that
the other case, the Vincent case of Minnesota, 1910, where
the master of a vessel was held liable in a case where a dock
was destroyed without the master's fault and the court said
the master was liable because after all it was his ship that
was saved, and so on and so forth. Why do you also call that
decision just? I mean, how do you harmonize them?
(Brown) Can you distinguish the two--the Minnesota
steamship case and the horse and buggy case?
(James) Well, I distinguish them for this reason-that
in the steamship case the owner of the steamship deliberately
appropriated the property of somebody else to save his own
greater property; whereas in Vincent v. Stinehour, there was
no such situation at all.
(Brown) Professor Parker?
(Parker) Yes. I think that is a very satisfactory answer. I can, as a matter of trade secret, produce a one-sentence
section of the Austrian Civil Code that solves the problem exactly as Mr. James and as the Minnesota Court proposed. It's
section 1306 (a) where it says, "If somebody causes a damage
in order to avert an imminent danger from himself or another
person, the judge must rule whether and to what extent
damages may be recovered."
(Brown)

Professor Kalven, do you want to come in on

this?
(Kalven) No, except I think Professor James has already stated it-it seems to me a case really of unjust
enrichment.
(Parker) It comes to that.
(James) That's right.
(Brown) Professor Chroust?
(Chroust) I would like to ask Professor James a question in the form of a hypothetical case that sets up the facts.
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A group of enthusiastic citizens, being much concerned with
the sale of pornographic literature, goes to the only drug store
in a small community and says, "Unless you discontinue selling this line of publications, we will no longer buy our drugs
from you." The owner says, "I'm awfully sorry. I have a
two-year contract to be an outlet for this particular publication." So this group decides no longer to purchase its daily
needs from the drug store and buys them in the next community, ten miles away. As a result, the drug store goes to
the dogs. Now who pays for the drug store?-the well meaning
citizens who put him out of business?
(James) Well, it seems to me that's a quite different
thing from the Vincent case because certainly those wellmeaning citizens there don't get or save their own property
out of which to make the payment here. They're doing it for
some moral reasons. I wouldn't-The doctrines that I was
espousing here wouldn't lead to liability in that case.
(Chroust) But couldn't you say that they're saving also
good, namely, morality among their children, certain moral
concepts which society has accepted? I think that point seven
of your values may be accepted, namely, the moral standards
of society. It is felt that this line of publication is seriously
threatening the morals of juveniles, so they take stepsperhaps these are strong steps and, as a result, the man has
to close down his store. Now who is going to reimburse him
for the loss?
(Brown) Professor James?
(James) Well, I think that the values they are trying to
save there justify their conduct. I have no difficulty in
seeing that. I don't, though, see any basis of liability. It
seems to me that when material damage like this is concerned,
the notions I have would involve unjust enrichment only
where the defendant-the one who is sued-gets enriched
in the kind of coin of the realm out of which he has to
pay damages.
(Brown) Professor Shuman?
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(Shuman) Then you'd only limit it to cases where the
defendant makes money, because if he doesn't make money,
he's not getting enriched in the coin of the realm.
(Brown) Professor James?
(James) Yes, this principle I would accept. Let me
say this: it isn't only where he makes money; it's where-it
would include a case like Vincent-where he preserves money
---either preserves or makes. That's right.
(Shuman) Well, then you are looking at the pocketbook
of your victims-of the defendants, rather. Yet you wouldn't
do that for individuals. Why is it good to do it for classes
of individuals, but not for individuals?
(James) Because it's the class that pays.
(Shuman) Is that always true of a particular defendant
in an industry where he's the sole producer, or are we talking
about classes of individuals, or of one individual's being a
class?
(James) Well, where a single producer in an industry
pays for the casualties of that enterprise-presumably he
then distributes that cost among the beneficiaries of the
enterprise, his customers and what not-that's quite the
right thing, that those men should pay for the casualtiesfor the cost in human casualties that this enterprise necessarily causes.
(Brown) Professor Shuman?
(Shuman) If you're willing to look into the pocket of
the defendant, then why don't we also look into the pocket
of the plaintiff?
(Brown) Professor James?
(James) I would on the whole. But the point is that, in
this classic case, the accident case, what studies there are
show that the pocketbook of the plaintiff is mighty slimis typically slim.
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(Brown) Professor Shuman, are you relating the pocketbook to justice or something like that?
(Shuman) Well, yes, I'm trying to suggest that I'm not
sure how Professor James justifies excursions into one pocketbook as the basis for liability.
(Brown) Professor Davitt?
(Davitt) I was wondering if Professor James would
agree that the pocketbook has a relation to the dignity of the
individual. (Laughter)
(Brown) Professor James?
(James) It certainly would in the way I was talking.
(Brown) Professor Kalven?
(Kalven) I'd like to ask Professor James a question.
Isn't it true that frequently it's the same pocketbook in the
end?
(James) Well, of course it is.
(Brown) What pocketbook is it?
(James) Well, it is often the plaintiff's pocketbookthat is, the plaintiff's pocketbook as one of a great group
of which he is a member.
(Brown) It's always the plaintiff's pocketbook, you say?
(James) No, I didn't say "always," by any means. I
said it often could be.
(Brown) Professor Shuman?
(Shuman) In which event, doesn't this position reduce
itself to a kind of absurdity unless you're prepared to go to
the full extreme of your principle and say, therefore, that
government insurance should be paid for all accidental injuries.
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(James) As a matter of fact, I think a great deal could
be said for that, if you call that an absurd conclusion. I
think there are some countervailing things that make me
doubt that. But I think that's a perfectly tenable position.
(Shuman) It is tenable, and I would say it's absurd only
because of the implications which it carries. It then seems
you're arguing an extreme kind of socialism for all kinds of
accidental injury.
(James) Well, perhaps it's because it's so extreme in
that form; but the fact that in its extreme form it's bad
doesn't mean that a good deal of the kind of thing is good.
For instance, what you were saying was said about Workmen's Compensation-that this was socialism. And I think
on the whole most people accept the justice of Workmen's
Compensation today.
(Brown) Dean Tinnelly do you think that the Luthringer v. Moore case, the California pest erradication case, was
justly decided on the basis of the doctrine of liability without
fault?-the extra-hazardous situation?
(Tinnelly) Except that while the conduct in that case
might be said to be controlled by the doctrine of liability
without fault, actually it was the undertaking of an ultrahazardous occupation, and therefore constituted what we
might call legal, rather than moral, fault.
(Brown) Do you think it was justly decided?
(Tinnelly) I think it was justly decided.
(Brown) Do we all agree it was justly decided?
(Kalven) Not me.
(Brown) Professor Kalven disagrees. Professor Kalven,
do you disagree?
(Kalven) I disagree for the reasons previously stated
-that is, I think that if you're operating here in very specific pockets, you're going to distinguish this kind of liability
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from some other kind; that there's nothing to show that
the particular kind of extermination was any more dangerous
than anything else; the criteria itself doesn't mean much to
me to begin with; and finally, I don't quite see just because
the activity was a little more dangerous, if you agree that
it was carried out as carefully as could be expected for that
kind of activity, why it should be held liable.
(Brown) Dean Tinnelly?
(Tinnelly) I think I might agree to this extent, that I
think it would have been much wiser if this could have been
anticipated and done by legislation rather than by a court
or by causing a defendant's loss without his realizing what
he was getting into.
(Brown) Professor Kalven?
(Kalven) I think my objection might go deeper than that.
I don't know what the legislature would decide either. I
don't see any basis -they're using this criterion as the-some
special hunch about the incidence of danger in different activities. I don't see any basis to think that it's any more
intelligible to a legislature than it would be to a court. It
might not even be intelligible to a jury, I might add.
(Brown) Dean Tinnelly?
(Tinnelly) I would agree that this might be another
area in which it is realized that no matter how careful you
are, there are going to be a certain, perhaps mathematically
calculable, number of accidents; and, therefore, it might be
another area in which we might have a form of insurance,
or a cost of doing business.
(Brown) Professor Kalven, are you concerned with the
difficulty of finding criteria for determining what is ultrahazardous?
(Kalven) That's right. It's in a sense a technical difficulty in terms of the general scope of this discussion, and it
goes primarily to the last remark Father Tinnelly made;
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that is, I think all activity is ultra-hazardous, in the sense in
which the exterminating might be ultra-hazardous.
(Brown) Well, this factor of the ultra-hazardous, is that
a scientific, physical, determinable thing, or is that a moral,
jurisprudential matter?
(Kalven) Well, I think that it's a basically physical
matter that depends upon some notion of frequency and a
statistical idea that seems to me utterly impractical, and,
say, almost meaningless.
(Brown) Professor Shuman?
(Shuman) Professor James before referred to this question also. I wonder why, with you, Professor James, that
because of its statistical probability to certain incidence of
injury that, therefore, justified the imposition of strict
liability.
(Brown) Professor James?
(James) Well-because this, it seems to me, equates the
enterprise that incurs this certain risk to the defendant in the
Vincent v. Lake Erie TransportationCompany case. When,
for instance, I undertake to run a railroad for a year or two
years, I know as a certain matter that it's going to take at
least a certain toll in life and limb. When I decide to do
that for my profit and others, in the face of that statistical
certainty, I am thereby enriching myself at their expense;
and the principle of unjust enrichment comes in.
(Brown) Professor James, do you think that a driver
of an automobile at the present time is morally blameworthy
on the objective level because of his knowledge of the statistical certainty of many resulting injuries to person and
property?
(James) No. As to a given driver, certainly that doesn't'
hold. But when the drivers combine their risks together in
insurance, then you can treat the drivers as a group, just as
you treat the railroad as a whole enterprise.
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(Brown) You mean the whole is greater than its parts?
(Laughter)
(James) I don't know if it's greater than its parts
or not, but the whole group is the one that's paying, and
the whole group knows or ought to know that there's going
to be this toll.
(Brown) Professor Shuman?
(Shuman) Well then, in that event, it would seem that
compulsory insurance would be morally improper because
you should require insurance according to groups: Real
good drivers-good rates; real bad drivers, very bad rates.
(James) I agree that this ought to be done, but this
has nothing to do with whether you ought to have compulsory
insurance, Professor Shuman. I think (a) you ought to
have compulsory insurance; and, (b) that it would be a very
good thing if you had a selection of risks along the lines
that you suggest.
(Brown) Professor Davitt, in view of this statistical
certainty, do you think the drivers of automobiles are deliberately causing injuries today?
(Davitt) Well, I don't imagine anyone is deliberately
causing injuries, especially to himself. However(Brown) Well, they know that somebody's going to be
killed. Do you agree?
(Davitt) I somewhat wonder at two things that Professor James said: that most of these accidents were blameless, I believe you said?
(James) Yes, I said that a great many-a-yes, a great
many of them are.
(Brown) Do you mean they're non-negligent?
(James) As far as-a-yes-as far as any moral blameworthiness is concerned. No, a lot of them involve negligence,
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but that's because negligence takes an amoral objective
standard and doesn't take into account things like accident
proneness. And the more we have made scientific studies into
the conduct that causes accidents, the more we find that if
we judge these men according to a subjective standardthat is, taking into account their own abilities-that they
would be blameless.
(Brown) Professor James, do you think that negligence
is not necessarily a moral matter?
(James) I'm saying-a-yes-I'm saying that legal negligence is not necessarily a moral matter, that it doesn't
correspond to it. That a man is held to the conduct of a
reasonably prudent man, whether he can meet that conduct
or not.
(Brown) And what is legal negligence?
(James) Legal negligence is falling below that objective
external standard.
(Brown) Professor Shuman?
(Shuman) There are two points I'd like to make, Mr.
James. First, that there's an important distinction which
need be drawn between an intentional act and a deliberate
act. And I think what you're saying, since all these injuries
are intentional but not deliberate, you don't deliberate about
running into somebody, but you intentionally drive a car, and
because of the statistical probability, the injury is intentional.
(Brown) Professor Shuman, you mean, in other words,
you set up deliberately the situation from which this results.
Is that it?
(Shuman) No, you intentionally participate, but you
don't deliberately injure. Professor James is saying you are
punished because you indulge in the intentional activity.
(James) I agree that there is a distinction. But the
distinction I would draw is this: Intentionally doing an act
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is when you recognize the moral certainty that that act will
cause harm. Now, after all, when Vincent tied his boat up
to the dock, he didn't want to injure that dock. He didn't
deliberately injure the dock in that sense. But he deliberately
did an act from which injury to the dock was a foreseen and
inevitable result.
(Shuman) He intentionally did an act.
(James) That's right.
(Shuman) He may or may not have deliberated about
the possible consequences. If a man pushes his wife over
the cliff on an impulse, that is an intentional act, but I don't
know if you'd call it deliberate, unless he planned it two weeks
before-or a day.
(James) Well, I don't know that deliberate adds anything to this, but he intentionally does an act when thewhen it will knowingly cause harm-when he must realize
that it will cause harm. ,
(Brown) Professor Chroust, do you believe that the
case of Sorenson v. Wood, the Nebraska defamation case, was
justly decided on the basis of liability without fault?
(Chroust) That's a huge order, I should say.
(Brown) I think Professor Kalven could give a ready
answer to that. Professor Kalven, you'd say-?
(Kalven) I'd say it's no more unjustly decided than
any other defamation case.
(Brown) But they're all unjustly decided?
(Kalven) Well, I'm riot sure. I think I'd say "yes" to
that.
(Brown) Very well. So we have a clear answer there.
Professor Chroust, do you agree?
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(Chroust) Yes, I think I'm inclined to agree with Professor Kalven.
(Brown) Do you all agree that this Nebraska defamation case was unjustly decided? Does anybody think that it
was justly decided?
(Parker) Yes.
(Brown) Professor Parker, you do? Will you proceed
to defend your position?
(Parker) Yes, it was justly decided if we get away from
the traditional concepts of liability. It was as justly decided
as any liability without fault case. Somebody runs a broadcasting station and is liable for incidents that occur from that
station. I am liable to pay taxes. Has anybody ever tried to
justify that on the moral grounds of negligence? No, and
there are many other obligations of that kind, and it may
be perchance that you can resolve the existence of a broadcasting station into a legal relation which obligates that the
broadcasting station should pay for injuries.
(Brown) Professor Parker, would it be just to compel
the owners of broadcasting stations to carry liability insurance in order to compensate those who are defamed?
(Parker) Well, a-I don't know how financially strong
broadcasting stations are. Maybe they don't need it. They
can pay it out of their own pockets. I mean-I wouldn't
say--no, I don't think it would be just.
(Brown) Professor James?
(Parker) That's their business, whether they are rich
or not.
(Brown) (To James) Do you want to address yourself
to this?
(James) Two points: First, a lot of broadcasting stations are fairly little-do business on a very little basis. And
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the second thing-a-point I want to make is this: that I
agree that there is some similarity to enterprise liability
(Parker) Yes.
(James) ... In the Sarensoncase, the reason that I would
decide it differently is for a different reason, and that is,
that the cost of doing it to society is too great. If we impose
strict liability on industry or on-a--on motoring, we're
not going to prevent people from motoring, and we're not
going to prevent people from industrial activity. If we impose
strict liability on radio stations, we're not going to make
them stop running radio stations either, but we are going to
make them very, very strict about allowing broadcasts of
public issues. In other words, we're going to make them strict
censors. And that, to my way of thinking, is much too high a
cost to pay for the kind of enterprise liability that I would
like to see in other fields.
(Brown) Professor Kalven?
(Kalven) I think that I agree with that. I'd like to come
back to Professor Parker for a moment. It seems to me that
his last excursion tends to make the distinction between
obligation and sanction a little too tricky. That is, it-if
we went back to the horse and buggy case, I suppose we could
say if we held the driver liable there, regardless of fault,
we'd just impose an obligation on him instead of a sanction,
and that takes care of that. That seems to me then to really
obliterate a possible real question that otherwise could arise.
(Parker) Yes. We could have done that. I mean that's
why Professor Brown posited the question whether or not the
horse and buggy case could have been decided on the grounds
of running a dangerous enterprise, such as a horse. In other
words, we didn't, and especially since the case was decided
in 1822, I didn't say that one has to decide this or that way.
I only meant to say that it is morally justifiable if a majority of citizens so agree.
(Brown) Professor Shuman?
(Shuman) May I ask a question of Professor James?
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(Brown) Sure.
(Shuman) Again, you are arguing, if I understand you
correctly, you were arguing before about negligence being
not morally blameworthy for, among other reasons, because
of the accident proneness of some individuals; this is therefore some kind of character trait, and to say that this is
morally bad stretches the concept of morally bad. But doesn't
this amount to saying that if you do a wrong thing often
enough, it ceases to be wrong?
(Brown) Professor James?
(James) I don't think it does. If you want to---of
course, if I got blind because I went on a bat one Saturday
night and got into a fight and went blind, does that mean
that I am morally wrong later on when I can't see the train
coming? I wouldn't think so.
(Brown) Professor Shuman?
(Shuman) I don't quite see the connections with that
situation and accident proneness.
(James) Well, accident proneness is, very often, is simply a physical thing, but it may also be a character defect.
Now the character defect, the kind of thing that leads to
compulsive behavior may have come from past below-standard
conduct.
(Shuman) But isn't this carrying determinism to a
really greater extent than you have determined it in previous senses?
(James) I don't think it's carrying determinism nearly
that far. It's simply recognizing that there are certain limits
within which we all must act, and I suppose that we all admit
that.
(Brown) Professor Shuman, go ahead.
(Shuman) Well, then you're saying that if a course of
conduct is due to physical difficulties, which resulted from
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an-this physical difficulty resulting from a morally wrong
act, you excuse the morally wrong act, but don't excuse the
consequences of injury which results from the physical
impairment.
(James) Well, I don't know whether I'd say exactly
that. But it seems to me that the moral wrongness of going
out on Saturday night and getting into a fight is not the
kind of thing that fairly can be said to have produced the
consequence of failing to see a train ten years hence on the
Chicago and Northwestern tracks.
(Shuman) Well, then only the things you can anticipate
for your presently morally wrong acts are the ones you'll
take into account?
(James) Well, I should suppose it would be something
like that that would limit the consequences. I don't suppose
that we're all irretrievably lost in all its aspects because
of-we may have been conceived in sin, or something like
that.
(Shuman) Well, we might as well put out a bigger
diary if we're going to keep track of all our acts for those
purposes.
(James) Well, I should think so. That's what I'm asking
you not to do.
(Brown) Professor Kalven, do you think that the Utah
mink case was decided justly-the mink killing her young
because of the blasting?
(Kalven) I think that it was probably decided erroneously because of the lack of familiarity on the part of the
court with the habits of mink. I think that the court regarded
it as just spectacularly idiosyncratic that the mother should
kill her children and apparently they would do that-I mean
they're very nervous and would react that way all the time.
On the other hand, I think the case has a point in it which
is that at some point you want to cut off strict liability no
matter what your initial premises are, and that seems to me
an interesting doctrinal difficulty.

1957-58] SYMPOSIUM ON STRICT LIABILITY

79

(Brown) Would anybody want to discuss the justice or
injustice of the mink case? (Pause) Well, now we've been
at this quite a long time, and I think we're in order-Professor Davitt, did you want to-?
(Davitt) I'd like to revert to the interchange between
Professor Shuman and Professor James.
(Brown) Go ahead, go ahead.
(Davitt) I'm wondering about the implications of Professor James' position. If most of these accidents, let's say
a traffic accident, are blameless, then I'd like to know what
you think about two things: 1) what about the justification,
then, of arrest and fine and imprisonment; and 2) what are
the implications of this principle in criminal law?
(James) Well, you ask me a very difficult question. I
suppose that one of the purposes of criminal law is to-is
its deterrent effect not only on the individuals arrested,
but on other people; and it's conceivable that although this
man's slips would be forgiven in heaven, it may be necessary
to make an example of him, but I certainly am not (Davitt) Well, let's keep it on a local court level here.
(James) Well, that was only a concession on my part.
(Davitt) Well, I don't believe we need that right now.
(James) All right, but I haven't thought through what
ought to govern criminal justice. It seems to me that this
is a thing that is very debatable. But I can understand, as
a reasonable proposition, the fact that it may be necessary
to punish people who've fallen below a certain standard of
conduct even though they didn't have the intelligence to
come up to it, in order to get its deterrent effect.
(Brown) Professor Cowan?
(Cowan) Professor James, haven't you really taken
only two classes of torts and attempted to generalize on their
basis? One, the automobile accident; and the second, enter-

LOYOLA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. IX

prise liability; and although they may be criminals in the
public eye, what about all the rest of the law of tort that
hasn't anything to do with either of those two situations
where the law itself may act as a strong deterrent, to follow
Father Davitt's notion?
(James) Well, I certainly agree with you. I have taken
only a few instances, and what I've tried to do is to show
that I don't feel that a single one of those principles is uniformly applicable-that there are some situations that call
for the application of what we might call strict liability,
and there are some where negligence or fault is more appropriate.
(Brown) Professor Cowan?
(Cowan) In other words, why can't we simply take
those few special classes of torts and-turn them over to
administrative law and then go on from there.
(James) That would be exactly my position.
(Cowan) Then you would be faced with the problem of
what to do about the great mass of the law of tort, which
is extremely complex. Would you say that it should be governed by the principle of fault?
(Brown) Professor James?
(James) Yes, I'd leave a great deal of the law of tort
to the principle of fault. My heavens, just think, I've just
written a book. It'd be terrible to have it all become outdated. (Laughter)
(Brown) Professor Chroust, do you want to address
yourself to this?
(Chroust) No, I want to return to the Sorenson case
because there's something troubling me. That's why I said
it was a big order, and I address Professor James.
(Brown) All right, proceed. Professor James is really
bearing the brunt of the afternoon.
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(Chroust) Yes, he's really on the firing line.
(Chroust) Now, in your value number one, you speak
about the dignity of the individual; and in value number
three, his freedom of speech, especially about matters that
concern the public. It seems that you think that the Sorenson
case was decided-shall we use the word "unjustly"-because
it violates principle number three. But how about--what
happened to principle number one.
(Brown) Professor James?
(James) Well, that's a perfectly fair question. I think
that the Nebraska court felt that principle number one was
more important than principle number three. It is simply
my own value-judgment that, in that Context, principle
number three is more important than principle number one.
(Brown) Professor Chroust?
(Chroust) Now I think we're getting somewhere. In
other words, the dominant values among these seven values
which you enumerated are determined by their particular
context. In other words, you don't give preference to one over
the other except in a special or particular context.
(James) Yes, I'd say so.
(Chroust) That bothered me.
(Brown) Professor James, do yc.u think you ought to
throw in mental well-being, spiritual well-being, together
with physical well-being or are those implied in(James) Oh, this is not--I don't begin to be exhaustive
here; certainly I was primarily concerned here with the
accident problem, and certainly there are many other values
that are not listed here.
(Brown) Professor Kalven?
(Kalven) I'd just like to make a small additional comment to this last exchange. It seems to me that value number
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one is also defended by not imposing liability in the Sorenson
case on the grounds of-that free speech carries with it
considerable implications for the dignity of the individual.
(James) Yes, that's true. And for many individuals.
(Brown) Professor Shuman?
(Shuman) May I take Professor James off the line for
a minute and ask Dean Tinnelly a question? Dean, why do
you feel so strongly that it's wrong to make-to determine
who should pay merely on the basis of who has money?
(Brown) Dean Tinnelly, did you say that, first of all?
(Tinnelly) I think I did. I think it would go back to
the problem of legal justice-that the state has the duty of
enforcing those things which can only be handled by the civil
government. Now, if there's a question of the defense of the
nation, then we certainly may take the position that he who
has money can be taxed severely. However, when you're
imposing an obligation to make a restitution for a harm that
has been committed, it seems to me that natural justice
imposes an obligation on the government to distribute these
burdens fairly, and that there would have to be something
more than ability to pay as the basis of that distribution.
(Brown) All right. Now the discussion has been going
on for one hour exactly, and I think it's time to throw this
open to the audience. Those who wish to speak will please
approach the platform and announce their names so that
their questions or comments may be recorded. All right, are
there any questions or comments from the floor?
(Brown) Professor Lucey?
(Rev. Francis E. Lucey, S.J. from Georgetown University Law Center) I'd like to ask Father Tinnelly a question.
It seems that most of you are trying to avoid purely social
utility or the deep-pocket theory as a rational basis for liability without fault. As a teacher of jurisprudence, that's a
problem which plagued me for years- -how to fit it in
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with the natural law system. Now actually, a thing is in
accord with natural law if it's reasonable and fair and doesn't
contradict that law on fundamental principles. My solution
of this whole question, at least covering most of the types of
cases that come up, as for instance, the Chicago Tribune case,
or broadcasting companies case, is this-I got the idea
actually from Holmes, and I'm trying to think of the case.
(Brown) Peck v. Tribune Co.?
(Lucey) No, no not Peck. The case came up from Arizona
and regarded a state deposit insurance act before we had
our Federal Deposit Insurance Act. Many of you will remember it. And the name of the case has escaped me, in which
Holmes said, you have no natural right to be a banker; but
if you want to be a banker, the state can lay down the
conditions under which you can be a banker. Now I say
the same thing with regard to employers, Workmen's Compensation Acts and all these other types of cases-in fact,
with regard to an automobile owner. You have no absolute
natural right to be a publisher of a paper or a manufacturer.
In fact, you have a right to life and to gain the means of
existence, but as to each specific type of activity, the state
can say you cannot do that except under these conditions
which are necessary for the common good of civil society,
and Father Tinnelly, I was wondering if that would fit in
with your explanation? - and Father Davitt might come in
on this too. Would this not give us a rational explanation
of the natural law view as to liability without fault where
it's a question of who's going to take the loss between two
innocent people. That's what it comes down to. There's no
question of negligence and no intentional wrong done, and
I'd satisfy myself that way and I'd like to(Brown) Dean Tinnelly, are you ready for the question?
(Tinnelly) I'd be in accord with that.
(Brown) Father Davitt, did you want to comment on'
this?
(Davitt) Well, yes.
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(Brown) All right.
(Davitt) First, I would say I'd qualify Father Lucey's
remarks a slight bit. Although a man doesn't have a right
to be a publisher, or let's say a doctor, nevertheless, I still
think there's a third thing between what the state can tell
him to do and what he has to do. A man might not have a
right to be a doctor, but he still may become a doctor. The
second thing I would say would be this-with regard to strict
liability: Father Lucey has spoken of how he, himself, justifies himself. I would justify it by assumed responsibility.
It may come to the same thing; but I would not impose liability on a man because he has the money, but because he has
assumed responsibility in engaging in this particular enterprise.
(Brown) Are there any questions or further comments
from the floor? Will you announce your name?
(Professor Alfred W. Blumrosen, from Rutgers University School of Law) Several things have occurred to me during
the course of this discussion; one of which is that there seems
to be a slight inconsistency in the reluctance of Father Tinnelly, and I suggest of several others, to go to the deep-pocket
theory and impose liability simply because one has money;
and yet, I find little or no reluctance to create a situation
where one will have money and then impose liability on some
assumed responsibility notion. In other words, we won't
say just pay because you have money, because it seems that
that would impose an obligation on the rich, whereas in the
same set of facts, a poor man might not be liable, and this,
I suppose is what is inconsistent with this sense of fairness,
or something like that; and yet, we are perfectly willing to
put the poor man into a group, which is what Prof. James
does, and then we have all kinds of rich people to treat, and
this,-then we don't worry about the problem. You don't
have any objections, do you, Father Tinnelly, to making
this- ?
(Brown) Do you want to point the question directly to
Father Tinnelly? Would you point the question-please repeat the question.
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(Blumrosen) Surely, do you object, or do you find objection, to creating a situation where we avoid the problem of the
poor man versus the rich man by putting the poor man in
the position of having access to the money which could be
used to compensate?
(Tinnelly) Well, first of all, on the deep-pocket theory, I
would say this: I would be opposed to something which in
the first case would impose liability on A, simply because he
could afford to pay the judgment; whereas, in another case,
B, who could not afford to pay judgment, would not be held
liable. On the other hand, I think that when you come to the
poor man who is injured, that we have a completely different
concept than the pure aspect of justice. There we have also
the concept of charity on the part of individuals to help to
contribute. For instance, if a man were destitute-if there
were no way in which he could be helped by the state, it
would be incumbent upon his neighbors to help him, and
possibly as a matter of conscience to help him, even though
it was not in justice, but in the virtue of charity. However,
the civil law has the obligation to step in under the doctrines
of both legal justice and social justice to take care of him,
because property, while it is a right, is not an absolute
right, it's a restricted right, and must be used for the benefit of others, but only according to law.
(Brown) Are there any further questions or comments
from the floor? Professor Shuman, did you want to make
a comment?
(Shuman) I'd like to suggest with regard to Father
Lucey's comment-I agree that there are no natural rights
to engage in business, but then, on the other hand, if there
are any such things as natural rights at all, I'm not just
sure why there isn't a natural right to engage in the business of being a publisher.
(Brown) Father Lucey, did you want to defend this?
Will you ask the question, Professor Shuman?
(Shuman) If there is such a thing as a natural right,
why is there not a natural right to be a publisher?
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(Brown) Father Lucey, is there a natural right to be
a publisher?
(Lucey) I think that it would be the same-that a man
has a natural right to engage in any type of work he desires, but he can't do that if it's harmful to civil society
and to others. But the state also has rights through the
natural law to regulate and effectively control its citizens
in their actions toward the common good-the achievement
of the common good. Now he has a right as long as he
doesn't violate the rights of others. That would be my answer to it.
(Brown) Professor Shuman?
(Shuman) Well, this is rather different from saying
there is no such thing as saying there is no natural right
to be a publisher.
(Lucey) Well, what I'm saying is this: you have no
absolute natural right to be a publisher. The natural law
says you have a right to existence; you have a spiritual soul
with certain faculties; you are a rational being; you have
an end different from inanimate things or non-rational beings. Therefore, you have certain fundamental rights that
come with your existence, and nobody else has a right to
interfere with those fundamentals. You have a right, therefore, to use your capacities as far as you can, as long as
the use doesn't interfere with like rights of others; and
that's why I'd say a man has no right to own a broadcasting station or to be a publisher except under conditions
which the state may reasonably impose upon him, so that
he doesn't create a harm to others. And I will also agree
with what Father Davitt said as to assumption of riskI think that one can say it is reasonable to hold that he
must assume the risk of damages for a loss which he cannot
foresee.
(Brown) Father Lucey, would you say that the doctrine
of liability without fault is more justly applied in the law
of torts than in the criminal law?
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(Lucey) I do not like it in criminal law. I'd rather have
it called a public tort because when a man commits a crime,
as in the -cases we had during prohibition for the transportation of liquor and so on, a man is branded as a criminal,
which is a stigma on him, in situations where he couldn't
have avoided doing what he did. He couldn't possibly have
foreseen. I don't like that. I think you could frankly call
them public torts or something of that kind.
(Brown) Professor Cowan, do you want to take issue
with Father Lucey on that?
(Cowan) No, not particularly with that special point,
but I'd like to make a general comment.
(Brown) Does anybody want to take issue? Professor
Cowan, you may proceed then.
(Cowan) It has to do with what Father Lucey especially said, and that is this: I gain the impression that
in the Restatement of Torts, my old law professor, Frank
Bohlen, and his associates seem to have been in the business
of codifying the Natural Law. Now I understand that Bill
Prosser and Wex Malone and Page Keeton are revising it.
I think those rascals are out to revise the Natural Law!
(Brown) Do any of those professors want to defend
themselves? (Laughter).
(Cowan) I'd like to make another comment if I may.
That is, I don't want to rest on that point.
(Brown) Professor James, do you want to be the advocate here?
(James) I don't know. I understand that Father Tinnelly did not feel that the natural law put the Civil Law in
a strait-jacket-that it allowed for latitude, for changes as
conditions changed and so forth. Isn't that so?
(Cowan) I wonder if I could reply to that?
(Brown) Professor Cowan?

LOYOLA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. IX

(Cowan) With deference to the various commentators
here, I wonder if we aren't talking about the Natural Law
in much too narrow and specific a fashion. I don't want to
speak for them, but it seemed to me that the principles of
the Natural Law have to do with some very enduring qualities of human nature, and that one runs into a great deal
of difficulty in attempting to distinguish Sorenson v. Wood
from the New Jersey case of the same general sort, where
one court rather thinks that there should be liability and
another thinks not, and that it has testimony that one is in
accordance with Natural Law and that the other is not. I
rather think that Natural Law as a philosophical principle
does deal with the more enduring qualities of human nature,
and I do think that here we have perhaps attempted to distinguish situations that the Natural Law would be, I might
say, simply not concerned with.
(Brown) Dean Tinnelly, would you say that the Natural
Law was more or less irrelevant to this discussion?
(Tinnelly) No. I wouldn't say it was irrelevant at all.
But I think that there are-well, to answer that, I'd have to
almost give a whole course in jurisprudence to the breakdown
of areas preferable and extensive to the Natural Law. I would
say that there is a violation in the Sorenson case of a principle
which would ultimately rest upon the Natural Law, namely,
that there was not sufficient notice given to someone, or
rather that the broadcasting company was forced to bear
the liability of the libel of the speaker despite the fact that
it had absolutely no control either over whether he was
going to say anything, or what he was going to say. So
that I would say that the Natural Law is concerned, but again
I'd say that it is not codified.
(Brown) Professor Davitt, do you want to address
yourself to this problem?
(Davitt) Yes, I think I'm going to be more or less in
agreement with Professor Cowan but, as we all agree, there's
no more vague term floating around this room, and everywhere else, than this "Natural Law."
(Brown) You mean the term is vague?
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(Davitt) Yes, the term is vague. I think if we'd ask
every man in this room to write down what he means by
it we'd get as many different answers. I think we ought to
make this distinction. If Natural Law is "natural", it's something that has to be known naturally, and this means a
judgment that a man makes naturally. I think that's one
thing, and those are the basic things, I believe, Professor
Cowan was talking about. Of the rest of the things that
could pertain to it are those judgments a man doesn't make
without reasoning. He makes them after some reasoning.
That's a different area, and you can also say these judgments are according to the Natural Law. Of course, you have
a foundation in the Natural Law for everything you discuss
that's good or bad. But what we all judge, all of us, instinctively, that would be the Natural Law known without
reasoning; and what we judge by a reasoning process, this
is also Natural Law but not known instinctively. I do think
we should think of the Natural Law in terms of this very
radical and sharp distinction.
(Brown) Dean Tinnelly, do you think that the Natural
Law is vague?
(Tinnelly) No, I don't think that the Natural Law is
vague at all. I'm certainly sure that if we were to reconcile
our verbal differences we'd have no difficulty at all.
(Brown) Well, Father Davitt?
(Davitt) I am pleased with this interpretation. To me,
the judgments of basic Natural Law are clear as crystal.
What is "vague" is the content of the judgments we afterward arrive at through reasoning and experience.
(Brown) You mean the application of it?
(Davitt) Yes.
(Brown) Professor Parker, do you-?
(Parker) Well, I just wanted to ask a brief question.
How can the Natural Law be not "vague" in the face of so
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many different opinions - different religions, different
creeds, Communism, and so forth. There is no institution,
practically, that hasn't been claimed as part and parcel of
the Natural Law-such as slavery. It has persisted for 10,000
years of human history and has been maintained as a "natural" institution. I think, in other words, we don't want
to bog down into a theological discussion. We can, nevertheless, rationalize the Sorenson case on positive law and s--y
that it is a good case.
(Brown) I'm doing my best to close this discussion, but
it's pretty hard. Father Davitt?
(Davitt) I agree completely with what Professor Parker
said. 'That's precisely my point. If you don't get fundamental
enough in the basic judgments, you have all sorts of diversities. I don't think that all of us naturally judge slavery
as good or slavery as evil. We reason to one or the other
judgment.
(Brown) Professor Davitt?
(Davitt) Regarding the proposition that slavery is good
or bad-I don't think that we all naturally and instinctively reach the same judgment, as Professor Parker has
properly said. But whether certain basic things like self
preservation, living in society, living an intellectual and
free life, sexual union to carry on the race are good or bad
-I'm saying those are more basic things and concerning
which we have unanimity of opinion. Past that, where reasoning and experience are necessary, it's a different story.
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